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The Accra Declaration offers a narrowly  ideological interpretation of the 
modern economy and proceeds to reject neoliberalism as the ideological 
foundation thereof. This article argues for a less ideological approach to 
public theology in its comment on the economy in a two-step argument.  
Firstly,  Neoliberalsim  is  neither  a  coherent  ideology  nor  a  plausible 
historical  narrative.  Economists,  who  are  the  presumed  architects  of 
neoliberalism  do  not  recognise  the  propositions  attributed  to  them  by 
either  the  Accra  Declaration  or  the  critical  literature  on  Neoliberalism. 
Secondly,  the  Accra  Declaration’s  ideological  framework  causes  it  to 
misrepresent  both  the  nature  of  modern  economies  and  their  objective 
results. An alternative, less ideological approach, would allow the Church 
to  appreciate  both  the  strengths  and  the  many  problems  of  market 
economies and would allow it to work with economists in resolving these, 
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Fifteen years ago, when I was a candidate for a scholarship, one of the panellists asked me “how can 
you be a Christian and an economist?”  That such a question would occur to a thoughtful panellist 
reveals much about the apparent tension between the world of economics and that of the Church; 
between the city of the world and the city of God.  Reading the Accra Declaration (World Alliance of 
Reformed Churches, 2004) reminded me of the discomfort I experienced all those years ago when I 
was suspected of either inconsistency or insincerity as a Christian economist. Economists view modern 
market economies (with all their faults) as progressive institutions that yield not only improved material 
welfare, but also as being supportive of civic liberties and personal virtues, and yet we read in the Accra 
Declaration that our professional judgement is radically at odds with the interpretation of Reformed 
Churches.  
 
Dirkie Smit is sensitive to this dilemma when he asks whether: 
  “...the brief narration of economic history [in the Accra Declaration] is the only true and accurate 
one that all Christian economists would give, so that it forms [an] integral part of the faith that is 
confessed - and if alternative accounts would be possible, what would the implications be for the 
logic and truth claims of the whole document?”   (Smit, 2009: 179) 
 
The answer is that there are other accounts of the nature of the modern economy and of economic 
history, accounts that do not gloss over the shortcomings of the modern economy, but which are 
sensitive to what is both good and what should be better.  By contrast the Accra Declaration reads the 
“signs of the times” through narrowly ideological lenses. And as a result, the “Confession of Faith” 
rejects a series of claims about the economy that no one would defend in the positive.  This ideological 
approach is not promising, as it substitutes a narrow ideology for a critical understanding of modern 
economies, the kind of understanding that Christians need to make this imperfect world a little less so 
every year.  
   
Reading neoliberal signs 
The first substantive section of the Accra Declaration summarises unwelcome aspects of the modern 
world: the continued suffering of the poor; high income inequality; problems of third world debt; 
resource  driven  wars;  pandemic  disease  and  limited  access  to  life-saving  drugs  and  environmental 
degradation.  We are then assured that these developments are “directly related to the development of 
neoliberal economic globalisation... an ideology that claims to be without alternative, demanding an 
endless flow of sacrifices from the poor and creation”, and what is more, Neoliberalism “...makes false 
promises that it can save the world through the creation of wealth and prosperity, claiming sovereignty  
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over life and demanding total allegiance, which amounts to idolatry” (World Alliance of Reformed 
Churches, 2004: pars, 9 and 10).   
 
This Neoliberalism has been portrayed as “...the most powerful ideological and political project in 
global governance to arise in the wake of Keynesianism” (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004: 275)  and 
commentators on the Accra Declaration assure us that “...the neoliberal model of the economy exists in 
the imagination of the hearts of the proud but not in the real world...”  (Dommen, 2009:  21).   
 
There are important precedents for the Church rejecting malevolent ideologies, such as the Catholic 
Church‟s rejection of Communism in Quadragesimo Anno (1931) and the German Evangelical Church‟s 
rejection  of  National  Socialism  at  Barmen  in  1934.    These  were  actual  ideologies  though,  i.e.  “a 
conceptual scheme with a practical application” (Blackburn, 1994: 185).  And neoliberalism?  It is not at 
all clear that a coherent ideology by that name exists, and when it appears, it does so almost exclusively 
on the pages of those who proceed to reject it. This asymmetry has also occurred to Thorson and Lie 
who found: 
 
  “An initial mystery facing anyone who wants to study neoliberal ideology in more detail is that there 
does not seem to be anyone who has written about neoliberalism from a sympathetic or even neutral 
point of view” (Thorsen and Lie, 2006: 2).  
 
In both the concise Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Blackburn, 1994) and the more hefty Cambridge 
Dictionary of Philosophy (Audi, 1995) there are no entries where “Neoliberalism” should be, between 
Neo-Kantianism  and  Neoplatonism.    The  Economics  encyclopaedias  fare  no  better:  neither  the 
massively  expanded  New  Palgrave  Dictionary  of  Economics,  nor  the  Concise  Encyclopaedia  of 
Economics has an entry for neoliberalism.  Proponents of neoliberalism, if there are any, have not 
apparently articulated the ideology coherently enough to be assumed into these collections.  And even 
the editors of a critical reader on neoliberalism found it “impossible to define neoliberalism purely 
theoretically” (Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005)
1.  
                                                       
1 The Declaration does provide a list of beliefs  upon which neoliberalism is supposedly based (World Alliance of Reformed 
Churches, 2004: par 9):  
 “Unrestrained competition, consumerism and the unlimited economic growth and accumulation of wealth are the best for 
the whole world; 
 The ownership of private property has no social obligation;  
 Capital speculation, liberalization and deregulation of the market, privatization of public utilities and national resources, 
unrestricted access for foreign investments and imports, lower taxes and the unrestricted movement of capital will achieve 
wealth for all; 
 Social obligations, protection of the poor and the weak, trade unions, and relationships between people are subordinate to 
the processes of economic growth and capital accumulation”. 
 
Commenting  on  the  Declaration,  Park  adds  the  following  assumption  to  his  understanding  of  Neoliberalism:  “...the 
assumption that the market, built on private property, unrestrained competition and the centrality of contracts, is the  
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While unable to define neoliberalism in a conceptually coherent manner, the critical literature moved in 
a  different  direction  to  construct  a  historical  narrative  that  serves  to  demonstrate  the  nature  and 
influence of neoliberalism.  The essay on neoliberalism in the Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Sociology 
(Gamble,  2007)  provides  such  a  narrative,  drawing  heavily  on  Harvey‟s  (2005)  A  brief  history  of 
neoliberalism.  
 
In this narrative, neoliberalism emerges as a countermovement to the social-democratic world order 
established  after  the  second  World  War.    Central  figures  in  this  movement  -  F.A.  Hayek,  Milton 
Friedman, Ludwig von Mises, Karl Popper and others - gathered at Mont Pelerin in Switzerland in 
1947 to discuss the political and intellectual climate of the day and the threats, as they then saw it, to 
liberal societies.  The attendants named a Society after this first meeting and the Mont Pelerin society 
have held regular meetings ever since and remains committed to its original and sole objective, i.e. “... 
to  facilitate  an  exchange  of  ideas  between  like-minded  scholars  in  the  hope  of  strengthening  the 
principles and practice of a free society and to study the workings, virtues, and defects of market-
oriented economic systems.” (www.montpelerin.org/mpsAbout.cfm).  
 
Harvey (2005) sees the “long march” of Neoliberalism stretching from Mont Pelerin via think tanks, 
such as the Institute for Economic Affairs in London and the Heritage Foundation in Washington, and 
the books of Friedman (especially, 1962 [2002]), Hayek (especially, 1960) and Nozick‟s (1974) later 
Anarchy, State and Utopia to political power with the coup of General Pinochet, the ascension of Deng 
Xiaoping in China and the election victories of Margeret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.   During the 
nineties the World Bank and the IMF would seal the Neoliberal capture of states, so the story goes, so 
that “those who followed, like Clinton and Blair, could do little more than continue the good work of 
neoliberalization, whether they liked it or not” (Harvey, 2005: 63).  
 
In addition to the forced genealogy of neoliberalism it is undoubtedly odd that there are no proponents 
for such an influential ideology, and even those authors who have been labelled as neoliberal by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
absolute law governing human life, society and the natural environment” (Park, 2005: 193), 2005: 193), to which Krüger 
added that “Neoliberalism... comes into collision with biblical monotheism, biblical anthropology, the biblical doctrine of 
salvation and other principal essential contents of the Christian faith, and so can only be rejected. To think of cosmetic and 
moral repairs to the system as such - or of making adjustments to it - is also completely pointless...” (Krüger, 2005: 232). 
 
And Gamble (Gamble, 2007: 3176) identifies a Neoliberal perspective on public policy according to which: “It is axiomatic 
in neoliberalism that government solutions are inferior to market solutions because they are less efficient in economic terms 
and they harm individual liberty. The solution to every public policy problem is to take responsibility away from government 
and allow markets to function freely”.  
 
This list (which can be extended) brings us no nearer to a coherent description of Neoliberalism as an ideology though, and 
none of these authors cite any proponents of the ideology.  This is notably odd, as one would have little trouble in citing the 
proponents of Marxism or National Socialism or any of the prominent ideologies of the modern era.  
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critical literature reject the label (Gamble, 2007) and prefer “liberal” or classical liberal” or in some 
cases libertarians. By contrast, one has no trouble in identifying the proponents of Marxism or (in the 
1930s) of National  Socialism.  It is even more peculiar to realise just how diverse the views of the so-
called neoliberals are with respect to the the appropriate balance between state and market (Jackson, 
2010). 
 
This elaborate conspiracy - barely convincing even to those who claim to have uncovered it
2 - weaves 
together champions of democracy such as Karl Popper and Milton Friedman with autocrats like Deng 
Xiaoping and republicans such as Reagan in a seamless cloth that “is the defining political paradigm of 
our time ... whereby a handful of private interests are permitted to control as much as possible of social 
life in order to maximise their personal profit” (McChesney, 1999: 40).   
 
The paradox whereby some of the most consistent defenders of liberal democracies in the twentieth 
century are grouped with despots like Deng shows the intellectual overreach of this critical literature. In 
defence of the conspiracy the critical literature contrives a sharp distinction between political freedoms 
in a democracy and economic freedoms to conclude that “neoliberals prefer authoritarian regimes that 
respect  basic  economic  freedoms  to  democratic  regimes  that  do  not”  (Gamble,  2007).  That  this 
association of despotism with Friedman, Hayek or Popper on the intellectual side or Thatcher and 
Reagan in politics is untenable, is clear from any serious reading of Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman, 
1962 [2002]), The Constitution of Liberty (Hayek, 1960), The Open Society and its Enemies (Popper, 1966a; 
Popper, 1966b) or the political history of the late twentieth century.  
 
The intellectual problems of herding together prominent liberal authors of the twentieth century in a 
neoliberal  conspiracy  are  compounded  by  the  history  of  the  term  “neoliberalism”.    Prior  to  its 
emergence in the critical literature, during the early eighties (Ver Eecke, 1982), the term was used in 
Germany to describe the ideas of the first two post-War German Chancellors to “combine a market 
economy with liberal democracy and some elements of „Catholic social teaching‟” (Thorsen and Lie, 
2006: 10).  In their conception of the state‟s role these neoliberals were a world away from the modern 
critical usage of that term; indeed they were enthusiastic supporters of an extended welfare state and a 
broad conception of the social responsibility of corporations.  It is ironic that the last group to identify 
                                                       
2 Harvey (2005: 36) admits that the “[neoliberals] do not necessarily conspire as a class” but argues that “...they nevertheless 
possess a certain accordance of interests ...they exercise immense influence over global affairs”.   
Any  conspiracy,  including  this  apparently  unconscious  one,  is  a  profoundly  implausible  theory  in  the  social  sciences, 
especially when the scale of the conspiracy reaches the extent claimed for neoliberalism. The implausibility can be shown by 
two objections: first, it vastly overrates the ability of individuals or groups to control complex societies, and second, it is 
empirically empty, because consistent with any and all observations (Popper, 1961; Popper, 1966b; Popper, 1992 [1949]; 
Popper, 2000 [1959]).   
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themselves  as  neoliberals  was  sympathetic  to  the  Christian  social  teaching  of  their  time,  while 
neoliberalism is the ideological error rejected by the Accra Declaration.   
 
The ideological approach taken by the Accra Declaration, therefore, runs into three problems: first, the 
objection is not against a rejection of a truth in the gospel, but a theory in the social sciences that is 
then connected to truths in the gospel via an ideological argument in the social sciences (Smit, 2009).  
This is a very different kind of claim for the church to make; instead of commenting directly on the 
gospel, its use of the gospel is qualified by the veracity of its social science.  The second problem with 
the ideological content of the Accra Declaration is that the suspect ideology exists mainly (or even 
exclusively) in the minds of its opponents. Finally, by adopting a strong ideological approach in its 
public theology the Accra Declaration precludes participation in the piecemeal policy debate which is 
most consistent with a modest assessment of what economists know about the economy.  
 
To demonstrate the alternative reading of the signs mentioned in the Accra Declaration the following 
two sections discuss two of these signs, they are: 
1. In a market economy “the purpose of the economy is to increase profits and returns for the owners 
of production and financial capital while excluding the majority of the people and treating nature as a 
commodity” (paragraph 13). 
2. The distribution of income internationally is “scandalous” and wealth accumulation occurs “at the 
expense of the poor” (paragraphs 7 and 12). 
 
The ‘purpose’ of a market economy 
A market (or decentralised) economy works by allowing people to specialise on their own initiative and 
then  to  provide  for  the  remainder  of  their  needs  through  exchange,  in  other  words  through  co-
operating.  It is one of the great discoveries of modern economics that the tremendous rise in income 
experienced since the industrial revolution cannot be attributed to using more land, or to a more 
intensive exploitation of workers, or even to a rapid accumulation of capital. Economists have tested 
these rival hypotheses and the data supports the argument that the bulk of long run growth (in per 
person terms) since the industrial revolution can be attributed to working smarter (that is, working 
more productively), not harder or with more inputs (Easterly and Levine, 2001).  
 
We work more productively when we specialise, and when we have been trained, not just to do a given 
task, but when we learn to learn, and use technological inventions to improve the productivity of our 
labour (Landes, 1998; Mokyr, 2002; Landes, 2003).  But this is not easy, to work smarter we have to co-
operate.  In different economic systems - capitalism, socialism,  a traditional society etc. - co-operation  
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is achieved through different sets of incentives (carrots and sticks) and they differ considerably in the 
degree of complexity they are able to sustain.  Markets offer one solution to this problem of co-
operation,  or  to  put  it  differently,  we  call  it  a  market  when  we  co-operate  in  a  non-coercive 
decentralised manner.   The crucial aspects of a market are: (i) that it is a form of co-operation that can 
occur between people with no necessary association (i.e. it can be impersonal); (ii) the co-operation is 
voluntary and (iii) the co-operation is decentralised.   
 
This kind of co-operation requires, at least, secure property and contract rights, a lot of information 
and, critically, bourgeois values that overlap considerably with Christian values (McCloskey, 2006)
3.   
Understanding the role of values in market co-operation may be particularly important in the discussion 
of a document such as the Accra Declaration which regards the modern economy as  an “immoral 
economic system” (par. 11).  
 
But this is a serious misrepresentation of market co-operation.  “The primary consequence  of people‟s 
participation in the market system” wrote Paul Heyne “...is a continuous expansion of co-operative 
endeavour, mutual accommodation, and valued goods” (Heyne, 2008: 38).  While it is possible for 
people to be motivated by selfishness in this collaborative effort, there is no reason to expect them to 
be selfish.  Indeed, one would expect the whole gamut of human motivation to be relevant in market 
co-operation.  And what is more, economists have established, in carefully constructed experiments 
and  from  studying  markets  in  action,  that  anti-social  behaviour  (whether  motivated  by  greed  or 
selfishness or another vice) is effectively discouraged through social sanction and/or reciprocity in 
market settings, whether in small groups or in extended markets with impersonal exchange (Smith, 
2008).  
 
Economists  do  not  now,  nor  did  they  in  the  past,  solve  the  problem  of  market  co-operation  by 
assuming „perfect‟ knowledge for individuals in a static system.  Rather, the emphasis in the main line 
of economic thought since the eighteenth century has been on people‟s epistemological limitations.  
For Hayek (1945 [1984]-a) this modest view of human capacity, or what he calls the “constitutional 
limitations of man‟s knowledge and interests, the fact that he cannot know more than a tiny part of the 
whole society and that therefore all that can enter into his motives are the immediate effects which his 
actions will have in the sphere he knows”, is the central problem in economics.   
 
Co-operation between people in such an order leads a person, or group, in Adam Smith‟s famous 
argument, “by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. … By pursuing 
                                                       
3 In an argument built around the three Sacred virtues (Faith, Hope and Charity) and four Natural Virtues  (Temperance, 
Prudence, Justice and Courage) McCloskey (2006) has shown that decentralsied or market co-operation not only requires 
virtues, but strengthens those virtues.   
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his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to 
promote it” (Smith, 1776 [1981]: 456). This “invisible hand”, which is so maligned in this literature, e.g. 
Terreblanche (2009), is a metaphor for the co-ordinating mechanism of a market and it refers to the 
feedback mechanism, often  prices, but quantities too, that signal  to the  participants whether their 
decisions and expectations are consistent with the decisions and expectations of others
4 (Barry, 1982). 
And these signals are usually generated under the pressure of competition, where competition is the 
rivalrous process of “decentralised planning by separate persons” (Hayek, 1945 [1984]-b: 79).  
 
Some  of  the  critical  features  of  the  market  order  described  here  are:  the  centrality  of  individual 
decision-makers that act on local information and the far-reaching impact of local decisions; a modest 
view of the capacity of any specific decision-maker, including businessmen and women, politicians and 
bureaucrats; feedback to these decision-makers about their decisions and plans through a highly non-
linear process of competition in which the price system plays a central role - a process that disseminates 
information and co-ordinates the activities of the many participating decision-makers, creating a social 
order  as  a  result  of  purposeful  action  by  the  participants,  even  though  that  order  was  not  their 
intention.  
 
Basil Moore has recently described systems that show these characteristics as complex adaptive systems 
(Moore, 2006) and there is now an expanding literature in economics which applies the insights from 
complexity theory to social settings (Hayek, 1974 [1989] ; Rosser, 1999). An important insight of this 
literature is that the social order, including all the transactions in a market, is an emergent property, the 
features of which cannot be known in advance, or as Hayek famously observed that the “... curious task 
of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can 
design” (Hayek, 1988).  
 
This does not mean that there is no role for government policy, or merely a minimalist role: the 
efficiency of the institutional framework might be greatly affected by government, either as a direct 
market participant (say a producer of public goods) or a regulator of certain markets.  What it argues 
against is a fixed notion of what government should do and what private initiative should do: the latest 
Nobel Laureate in Economics, Elinor Ostrom, has spent a career showing how policies that work well 
in one set of circumstances can be disastrously counterproductive in other circumstances (see, for 
example, Ostrom, 2000).  Modern economics teaches that the division between the appropriate roles 
                                                       
4 This feedback mechanism, the invisible hand, is crucial to understanding the remarkable efficiency of market co-operation.  
Profit is a part of this feedback mechanism and crucial indication of the success or failure of firms and their projects.  
Profits are not, therefore, the goal of a market economy; rather they are part of the feedback mechanism of market co-
operation.  From this perspective “profit maximizing... is a procedure for behaving economically, for being a good steward” 
as Paul Heyne observed, and he continued “the Greek word for steward, used in the New Testament, is in fact oikonomos” 
(Heyne, 2008: 400).   
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for markets and the state is highly fluid and context bound and suggests that fixed ideological positions 
are likely to be wrong in any particular application.  
 
But if this market economy is truly a complex adaptive system, then it is meaningless to ask, as the 
Accra Declaration does, about the “purpose of the economy” (par. 12). Saying that the economy has no 
purpose, does not deny that we, either  individually or in groups can pursue goals.  “People have 
purposes...” as Deirdre McCloskey (2006: 24) has written “...A capitalist economy gives them scope to 
try them out”. And these goals have been pursued with remarkable success since the modern economy 
has proven to be responsive to the needs of all members of the society. It is a highly progressive system 
and the just more than 200 years of its existence has seen the greatest material advance in the history of 
human kind, the greatest improvement in health and in the broad participation of all members of 
society in these advances. And these sustained gains are more impressive still when contrasted with the 
highly  episodic  character  of  growth  and  the  pervasive  material  stagnation  prior  to  the  industrial 
revolution (Diamond, 1997; Landes, 1998; Maddison, 2002).  
 
What is happening to poverty and inequality internationally? 
The  description  given  above  of  a  “highly  progressive”  system  contrasts  sharply  with  the  Accra 
Declaration‟s depiction of the modern economy where “...the number of people living in absolute 
poverty on less than one US dollar per day continues to increase... [in a ] system of wealth accumulation 
at  the  expense  of  the  poor”  (paragraphs  7  and  14).  While  I  argued  above  that  the  Declaration 
misrepresents the nature of a modern economy I will argue here that it also misrepresents its outcome.   
 
Starting  with  the  distribution  of  income  at  the  level  of  countries,  one  observes  that  the  richest 
countries, such as the USA, have maintained steady growth and their average incomes have risen, while 
some of the poorest countries in the world, for example Somalia, have stagnated and their average 
incomes  have  fallen  further  behind  that  of  the  richest  countries.    Economists  call  this  the  “great 
divergence” and it refers to the increasingly skew distribution of income across countries (Pritchett, 
1997).  
 
But this is not the end of the story about international inequality: taking the world‟s population as a 
whole  (by  factoring  in  the  differences  in  population  size  between  countries),  the  poor  have  been 
catching up with the rich. The reason for this is that most of the poor live in countries in East and 
Southern Asia that are growing faster than the world average: there are roughly 3 billion people in the 
group of globalising developing countries that have - over the last thirty years - been catching up with  
11 
the billion or so people in the developed world. In other words, the world‟s income distribution has 
turned the corner; for the first time it is becoming more equal (Sala-i-Martin, 2002).  
 
What has happened to world poverty in this process?  In 1981 the proportion of the world's population 
living below the poverty line of 1$ per day mentioned in the Accra Declaration was just over 40%.    By 
the year 2004, this incidence of poverty had declined to 18%, after adjusting for inflation (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2007). This extraordinary decline over a relatively short period, a period during which the 
world population itself expanded, means that not just the proportion, but the total number of poor 
people have declined from around 1.2 billion to around 900 million
5.  Of course this progress has been 
very uneven geographically: in China, for example, over the same period 500 million people have 
emerged from the deepest poverty, while the poor population in Sub-Saharan African expanded by 120 
million people (Chen and Ravallion, 2007). The data then does not confirm the Accra Declaration‟s 
strong  claims  about  poverty  (as  discussed  here)  or  the  other  outcomes  of  market  economies  as 
discussed in the modern economic literature.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article I have argued that the energy directed at the so-called Neoliberal ideology in the Accra 
Declaration is misdirected. Market economies do not function as described in the Accra Declaration 
and  do  not  conflict  in  any  fundamental  way  with  the  perspectives  of  Christian  ethics.  Far  from 
destructive  to  life  and  morals,  market  co-operation  has  been  tremendously  progressive,  leading  to 
substantial gains in the global fight against poverty. Yet the progress is uneven and blighted with many 
problems, not the least of which is the tremendous ecological problems we are already facing and 
which will likely become worse, before (and if) they get better. 
 
Finally, the recognition of problems in a dynamic and progressive system is not a case for abandoning 
the system; it does argue against complacency and for continuous experimentation. I have deliberately 
contrasted  the  view  of  modern  economics  with  the  perspective  of  the  Accra  Declaration  to 
demonstrate that we should not be so easily satisfied by narrowly ideological accounts of systems as 
complex  as  the  economy.    My  intention  was  not,  however,  to  discourage  wider  debate  on  these 
questions; on the contrary, abandoning a narrowly ideological approach opens space for listening, for 
real debate and for persuasion.  
 
                                                       
5 The construction of these numbers is subject to large errors (Deaton, 2003), but the trend is not in doubt (Deaton, 2002).   
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